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Abstract
The founding idea of linear logic is the duality between A and A?, with values in ?. This
idea is at work in the original denotational semantics of linear logic, coherent spaces, but also
in the phase semantics of linear logic, where the \bilinear form" which induces the duality is
nothing but the product in a monoid M; ? being an arbitrary subset B of M. The rather crude
phase semantics has the advantage of being complete, and against all predictions, this kind of
semantics had some applications. Coherent semantics is not complete for an obvious reason,
namely that the coherent space K interpreting ? is too small (one point), hence the duality
between A and A? expressed by the cut-rule cannot be informative enough. But K is indeed the
simplest case of a Par-monoid, i.e. the dual of a comonoid, and it is tempting to replace K with
any commutative Par-monoid P. Now we can replace coherent spaces with \free P-modules
over P", linear maps with \P-linear maps", with the essential result that all usual constructions
remain unchanged: technically speaking cliques are replaced with P-cliques and that is it. The
essential intuition behind P is that it accounts for arbitrary contexts: instead of dealing with
 ; A, one deals with A, but a clique of  ; A can be seen as a P-clique in A. In particular, all
logical rules are now dened only on the main formulas of rules, as operations on P-cliques. The
duality between A and A? yields a P-clique in K, i.e. a clique in P; strangely enough, one must
keep the phase layer, i.e. a monoid M (useful in the degenerated case), and the result of the
duality is a MP-clique. We specify an arbitrary set B of such cliques as the interpretation of ?.
Soundness and completeness are then easily established for closed 1-formulas, i.e. second-order
propositional formulas without existential quantiers. We must however nd the equivalent of
12F (which is the condition for being a \provable fact"): a MP-clique is essential when it
does not make use of M and P, i.e. when it is induced by a clique in A. We can now state
the theorem:
Let A be a closed 1 formula, and let a be a clique in the (usual) coherent interpretation
A of A, which is the interpretation of a proof of A; then a (as an essential clique), belongs to
the \denotational fact" A interpreting A for all M; P and B. Conversely any essential clique
with this property comes from a proof of A. c© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Completeness
1.1. Classical completeness
The traditional semantical idea is to interpret formulas by some kind of models, thus
yielding
 Soundness results: A provable formula is true in any model.
 Completeness results: A formula true in any model is provable.
This result holds of course for classical logic; it can be extended to other logical
systems: for instance, intuitionistic logic is sound and complete w.r.t. Kripke models
(and also w.r.t. topological models).
1.2. Phase semantics
A similar result holds for linear logic which is sound and complete w.r.t. phase
semantics, see in particular [3, 2.1]. Phase semantics is based on a commutative
monoid M, together with a distinguished subset B of M; a formula will receive \truth
values" in M, i.e. a formula A will be interpreted as a subset A of M. The crucial
notion is the duality between A and A?: given m2A; m0 2A?, then mm0 should
be a \truth value" for ?, i.e. mm0 2 B (=?). One therefore denes orthogonality
between objects of M by means of m ? m0,mm0 2 B. In this respect the product
behaves like a bilinear form (hm;m0i=mm0) with value in B, which plays the role
of the \scalars". The symmetry of linear logic (involutivity of negation) forces one to
interpret any formula by a fact, i.e. by a subset X of M equal to its biorthogonal;
among all facts, the set B interprets the constant ? and the \bilinear" form can be
seen as the canonical map from X; X? to ?. The interpretation of connectives consists
in building new facts from existing ones, and in particular the Tensor product F ⊗G
is dened as (F:G)??; the product is therefore used twice, both for the multiplicative
conjunction and the duality.
Soundness, i.e. the fact that 12A for all provable A, is proved without problems;
however this is a non-trivial result, since nothing in the notion of commutative monoid
M and arbitrary subset B makes any reference to the peculiar laws of linear logic.
Completeness is proved in a more ad hoc way: it consists in exhibiting, among all
possible pairs, M the commutative monoid of contexts (i.e. multisets of formulas 1 )
and among all possible B the set of all provable contexts. As usual completeness is
slightly frustrating, the only positive point about it being that this particular choice of
phase model is particularly inconspicuous in the theorem: \A is provable i 12A
for any phase model (M;B)"; this stresses the fact that, if completeness is a desirable
result, soundness should not be contrived.
By the way observe that completeness is by nature limited to a specic kind of
formulas: rst-order formulas, and more generally second-order formulas in which the
1 On p. 24 of [3] a footnote is missing after \(i.e. multisets of formulas", namely \We ignore the multi-
plicities of formulas ?A, so that I is the set of contexts ? ".
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positive second-order universal (resp. existential) occur only positively (resp. nega-
tively): such formulas are called 1 (their negations are called 1). Completeness fails
for non-1-formulas, 2 hence its denotational extension, which implies usual complete-
ness will be limited to 1-formulas.
1.3. Categorical completeness
However, these extensions are not completely satisfactory, since we are dealing with
constructive systems, for which the notion of proof is central: soundness and com-
pleteness only refer to the weaker notion of provability, i.e. w.r.t. models which can
distinguish between two formulas, but not between two proofs of the same formula.
However there is a semantics of proofs whose general mathematical expression
is categorical semantics: a proof of an implication A)B is a morphism from the
interpretation A of A to B. Categorical models of intuitionistic and linear logic
associate dierent interpretations to distinct proofs of the same formula; but to which
extent are they complete? In other terms, given a morphism from A to B is the
interpretation of a proof of the implication A)B? Up to now there is no satisfactory
solution. Of course, it is possible to give the abstract denition of an intuitionistic
category (e.g. a CCC, i.e. a closed cartesian category) and to prove some forms of
completeness w.r.t. such categories, but it is easy to argue that a CCC is nothing but
another presentation of intuitionistic logic, so what? For the same reason one should
reject, as contrived, any linear categorical completeness based upon \linear categories",
i.e. upon the categorical axiomatization of linear logic.
1.4. Denotational completeness
We shall therefore limit ourselves to concrete categories, and we shall denitely work
with coherent spaces, the original semantics of linear logic. 3 A general exposition of
coherent semantics can be found in [3], see Section 2.2, from which we borrow the
terminology and notations.
Starting with an assignment of coherent spaces to atomic formulas, one can associate
a coherent space A to any formula A, and a clique @A to any proof  of A. This
is obviously the starting point for a soundness theorem, expressing that the rules of
linear logic can be interpreted as operations on cliques of coherent spaces. But there is
no obvious completeness counterpart, i.e. a result that would basically say that every
clique in A is of the form  for some proof  of A:
 The empty set is always a clique in A, whereas the interpretation of a proof is
usually non-empty.
2 This is one of the possible readings of Godel’s incompleteness, since the Godel sentence G can be written
8x(N(x))F(x)), with F(x) a rst-order and N(x) (which expresses that x is an integer) a second-order
1-formula: G, which is 1 is true in any model (in fact: true) without being provable.
3 Intuitionistic logic can be seen as a subsystem of linear logic, hence what we are doing applies also to
intuitionistic logic.
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 All constructions are usually innite, but recursive in the parameters; hence non-
recursive cliques are not the interpretation of any proof.
In order to x this failure, one must modify something in the interpretation, e.g.
replace coherent spaces with something else, require some additional properties of the
cliques, etc. But this is a non-trivial endeavor; in particular most modications will
accept the following extra principles:
 The mix-rule, namely the principle A⊗B(AoB.
 The identication between the two multiplicative neutrals 1 and ?, both interpreted
by a space K with one point.
 The identication between the two additive neutrals 0 and >, both interpreted by
an empty space.
1.5. The denotational duality
The only reasonable idea is to build a duality between X and X?: there is a canonical
bilinear map from X ⊗X? into K, where K is the unit coherent space interpreting the
constant ?; concretely, if a@X and b@X?, then the clique ha; bi (which has at most
one point) is the singleton K when a\ b 6= ;, and ; otherwise. The idea would be to
select a set B of cliques in K, and to dene a ? b , ha; bi 2 B when a@X and
b@X?; a formula would therefore be interpreted by a denotational fact, i.e. a set of
cliques in X equal to its biorthogonal.
The idea is not too bad, but it eventually fails for want of suitable B (only four
possible choices). For instance, if B is empty, a denotational fact will either be empty
or consist of all cliques in X ; on the other hand, if B is non-empty, we must accept the
elements of B as the interpretation of proofs of ?, and more generally that both A and
A? might have proofs, which goes against completeness: : : unless we admit that cliques
of A which are accepted will eventually be refused when completeness is at stake.
So among the elements of a denotational fact it is necessary to distinguish between
two classes of citizens, the higher kind, essential cliques being the subclass to which
completeness applies: : : but there is no immediate way to make such a distinction.
1.6. Expanding the category
The solution comes from a close examination of the completeness argument w.r.t.
phase semantics: one introduces the monoid of provable contexts. But since we are
replacing \provability" with \proofs", one should instead consider the set B of proofs
of arbitrary contexts   (or rather their denotational interpretation). Indeed, one can
build a gigantic coherent space P, a kind of \innite o " of all coherent spaces
A. As to its structure, P is a kind of monoid, exactly a Par-monoid, i.e. it is
equipped with a \Par-multiplication": PoP(P and a \Par-neutral": K(P. 4 B can
be seen as a set of cliques in P. Now the basic idea is to replace plain proofs of A
4 The typical Par-monoids are spaces ?X .
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(seen as cliques in A) with proofs of  ; A (seen as cliques in PoA). The duality
between X and X ? becomes a duality between PoX and PoX?: given a clique
a @ PoX , a clique b@PoX?, the interpretation of the cut-rule yields a clique
c @ PoP, which can be mapped by \Par-multiplication" to a clique ha; bi@P. The
basic orthogonality is therefore ha; bi 2B, and one can elaborate the semantics on this
basis (i.e. a denotational fact is set of cliques in PoX equal to its biorthogonal, etc.).
Since B is far from being empty, a denotational fact will hardly be empty, hence not
all inhabitants should compete when completeness is at stake; but if we restrict to
inhabitants that are induced by a clique in X by means of the \Par-identity", then we
obtain completeness; indeed those cliques correspond to proofs with empty contexts.
But remember that completeness should not be achieved at the price of a contrived
soundness; fortunately, we can forget our particular P and B and observe that the
interpretation works without any hypothesis on them, just as soundness w.r.t. phase
semantics works for arbitrary B. It remains to give a status to our use of a Par-monoid
and the answer is extremely simple: all usual notions of linearity are replaced with
P-linearity, the familiar case being nothing more than the case P=K. This is clearly
analogous to the replacement of commutative groups with R-modules, the ground case
being the case R=Z.
The fact that certain proofs have empty interpretations forces one to slightly com-
plicate this very simple pattern: an additional commutative monoid M (which only
matters in the case of empty cliques) must also be introduced. This copes with the
degenerated cases of coherent semantics, i.e. empty cliques, in which the denotational
information is absent, which forces one to deal with \truth values". The modication
induced by the auxiliary monoid to coherent semantics is modest, almost invisible, and
our redaction tries to forget about it; but it is a natural modication, involving a notion
of M-linearity with very satisfactory properties.
1.7. What has been achieved?
This is always a delicate question, when we speak about completeness. For in-
stance, the rst reaction of Yves Lafont in September 86 to phase semantics was some-
thing like \abstract nonsense", whereas later developments (including recent works by
Lafont) suggest a less severe judgement. For the same reason, one should not be too
harsh against the use of abstract monoids and abstract Par-monoids: eventually some
application of this abstract nonsense will be found. Moreover, conceptually speaking,
the individuation of a structure of \module" over a monoid and=or a Par-monoid in-
duces an additional dimension in denotational semantics, which was obviously missing.
2. The category COH(MP)
Our goal is to introduce the category COH(MP) in two steps by adjoining two rather
independent parameters, M and P. In fact, the usual category of coherent spaces will
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appear as the particular case COH(IK), whereas the sole addition of M corresponds
to COH(MK), and the sole addition of P corresponds to COH(IP). COH(MP)
is basically obtained by changing the notion of morphism, and that is why we shall
concentrate on:
 generalizing the notion of clique (from cliques to MP-cliques);
 presenting morphisms from X to Y as functions sending MP-cliques of X to MP-
cliques of Y and which are linear in a most straightforward sense; by the way the
MP-cliques of X will be just the MP-morphisms from K to X .
2.1. The category COH
We just content ourselves with an alternative description of linear maps:
Denition 1. A family (ai) of cliques of X is said to be coherent when its union is
a clique; in fact the family (ai) is coherent exactly when the ai are pairwise coherent.
We use the notation a=
P
ai to mean that:
 a is the union of the ai;
 the (ai) are coherent;
 the (ai) are pairwise disjoint,
and we say that a is the coherent sum of the ai.
Proposition 1. Let f be a function mapping cliques of X to cliques of Y ; then f is
linear i it preserves all coherent sums; i.e. i f(
P
ai)=
P
f(ai) for any coherent
disjoint family.
Proof. Assume that f preserves all coherent sums; then
 f(;)=f(;+ ;)=f(;) + f(;) forces f(;) to be empty. 5
 Assume that a and b are compatible cliques; then a[ b=(a−b)+(b−a)+a\ b, a
coherent sum. f(a)=f(a− b) +f(a\ b); f(b)=f(b− a) +f(a\ b); f(a[ b)=
f(a− b) + f(a\ b) + f(b− a), hence f(a[ b)=f(a)[f(b).
 It is easily shown that f preserves all unions (not only nite ones).
 If a and b are compatible, then f(a − b); f(b − a) and f(a\ b) are disjoint, so
f(a\ b)= (f(a− b) + f(a\ b)) \ (f(b− a) + f(a\ b))=f(a)\f(b).
Conversely stability implies that f preserves disjointness, and from preservation of
coherent unions we immediately get preservation of coherent sums.
2.2. The category COH(MK)
In the sequel M is a commutative monoid, noted multiplicatively; all denitions are
trivial if M= I, the trivial monoid, i.e. COH(IK) is COH.
5 This proof does not make use of sums of empty families.
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Denition 2. A M-clique in a coherent space X is a pair (m; a) of a point m 2 M
and a clique a@X . Two M-cliques (m; a) and (m0a0) are coherent when m=m0 and
a[ b is a clique. One denes in a similar way the union, the intersection, disjointness
of two coherent M-cliques; one can also dene the sum of a disjoint coherent family,
provided the family is non-empty.
The scalar multiplication of a M-clique (n; a) by a scalar m2M is dened as
m:(n; a)= (m:n; a).
A map f from M-cliques of the coherent space X to M-cliques of the coherent
space Y is M-linear when:
 it preserves all coherent sums of non-empty families;
 it preserves scalar multiplication, i.e. if m 2M and a is a M-clique, f(m:a)=m:f(a).
Proposition 2. A M-linear map from X to Y is of the form f(m; a)= (m:m0; g(a))
with m0 2M and g a linear map from X to Y . Conversely, given m0 and g as above,
the formula f(m; a)= (m:m0; g(a)) denes a M-linear map from X to Y .
Proof. f(1; a)= (m(a); g(a)) for a certain function g from X to Y which is easily
shown to be linear. Moreover if m(;)=m0, then it is immediate that m(a)=m0; by
linearity over M we get f(m; a)=f(m(1; a))=m:m0; g(a)). Conversely any function
f of the given form is M-linear.
Hence M-linear maps from X to Y are in bijection with M-cliques in X (Y , and
composition of (m;f) with (n; g) is (m:n; fg). More generally everything already done
with coherent spaces adapts, mutatis mutandis to the new category. For instance the
set of all M-linear maps from X to K is isomorphic with the set of all M-cliques
in X?.
The monoid essentially distinguishes between several (pairwise incoherent) empty
sets, and a M-clique is a usual clique plus an emptyset contained in the clique. We
can see the monoid as a way to desingularize the additive neutrals (more generally all
the cases involving empty coherent spaces): the duality between X and X?, when X
has an empty web takes all empty M-cliques of K as values. In particular, we see that
the case where X has an empty web is already as rich as usual phase semantics.
2.3. Par-monoids
From now on we shall work as if the connective o were literally associative, and
similarly as if the neutral element K were literally the neutral element; 6 this saves a
lot of useless diagrams, and can be made rigorous anyway.
Denition 3. A (commutative) Par-monoid is a coherent space P together with a
linear map c from PoP to P, and a linear map w from the unit coherent space K
6 Of course it is impossible to do the same with commutativity.
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interpreting ? into P (i.e. a clique in P), enjoying the analogue of commutativity,
associativity and neutrality, namely the commutativity of the diagrams:
and
where  stands for the \ip" between two copies of P and P stands for the identity
map of P. The last two diagrams make use of our conventions concerning associativity
and neutrality. The map c is called Par-multiplication, or better contraction, whereas
the map w is called Par-neutral, or better weakening.
Remark. The typical example of a Par-monoid is a space? X equipped with the maps
corresponding to contraction and weakening. Among Par-monoids there is a distin-
guished one, namely the space K (with trivial maps c, w). Par-monoids have been
introduced in [2] under the name \negative correlation spaces". We prefer to now use
a more transparent terminology: in this way a usual monoid would become a Tensor-
monoid, and the dual of a Par-monoid, i.e. what is usually called a comonoid would
become a Tensor-comonoid (what is usually called comonoid) whereas the dual of
monoid would become a Par-comonoid. There is only one defect with this new ter-
minology, namely that it does not stress enough the analogy with rings: the operation
c behaves like a multiplication (and w like the unit) of a ring, the addition being
mimicked by the sum of coherent cliques.
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2.4. The category COH(IP)
In the sequel, P stands for a Par-monoid. All denitions are trivial when P=K, i.e.
COH(IK) is COH, which is consistent with our previous notations.
Denition 4. Let X be a coherent space; then a P-clique in X is a clique a@X oP.
In particular (remember our convention saying that K is literally neutral); a P-clique
in K is a clique a@P.
Denition 5. Let X and Y be coherent spaces; a P-morphism from X to Y is a function
f mapping P-cliques of X to P-cliques of Y and enjoying the following:
 f preserves arbitrary coherent sums;
 consider the linear map foP from X oPoP to Y oPoP; it can be seen as
a map from P-cliques of X oP to P-cliques of Y oP: we require that (Y o c)
((foP)(a))=f((X o c)(a)) for any P-clique a of X oP. In other terms the fol-
lowing diagram is commutative:
Proposition 3. P-morphisms from X to Y are in natural correspondence with
P-cliques in X (Y .
Proof. f is indeed a linear map from X oP to Y oP. Now observe that X ow
induces a canonical map from X to X oP, so f(X ow) is a linear map g from X to
Y oP. Using the isomorphism
X ( (Y oP) ’ (X (Y )oP;
we can associate a P-clique of X (Y with f.
Conversely, a P-clique in X (Y induces a linear map g from X to Y oP, hence
a linear map goP from X oP to Y oPoP, and using contraction, a map (Y o c)
(goP) from X oP to Y oP. This map f, seen as a map from P-cliques to P-cliques
can be shown to be P-linear, by means of the commutative diagram:
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The two operations are then easily shown to be reciprocal, by means of the com-
mutative diagrams:
and
In particular, the set of all P-linear maps from X to K is isomorphic with the set
all P-cliques in X?. The situation is similar to the one created by the monoid, but for
the fact that P desingularizes multiplicative neutrals. The basic duality between X and
X? will produce a P-clique in K, i.e. a clique in P. We use the notation a@PX to
say that a is a P-clique of X .
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Remark. In terms of category theory, this is not more than the remark that the functor
{ o P is a monad and that the category COH(IP) is the Kleisli category of this
monad. More concretely, this is nothing but the abstract nonsense version of familiar
properties of free modules over a ring.
Let us give some useful denitions:
Denition 6. Assume that a and b are P-cliques in X and Y ; then they are cliques in
X oP and Y oP; to which we can apply the semantic constructions of linear logic;
in particular,
1. we can apply a ⊗-rule between a and b, so as to get a clique in (X ⊗ Y )oPoP,
and we can contract the two P, so as to get a clique a⊗ b in (X ⊗ Y )oP, i.e. a
P-clique in X ⊗ Y ;
2. we can apply a o -rule between a and b; so as to get a clique ao b in (X o Y )oP,
i.e. a P-clique in X o Y ;
3. we can apply a -rule to a; so as to get a clique 1(a) in (X  Y )oP; i.e. a
P-clique in X  Y ; one denes similarly the P clique 2(b) in X  Y ;
4. we can apply a !-rule 7 to a, so as to get a clique !a in !X oP, i.e. a P-clique in
!X ;
5. we can apply a dereliction rule so as to get a clique d?Z(a) in ?Z oP, i.e. a MP-
clique in ?Z ;
6. if X =K, then we can apply a weakening rule so as to get a clique w?Z(a) in
?Z oP, i.e. a MP-clique in ?Z ;
7. if X =?Z o ?Z , then we can apply a contraction rule so as to get a clique c?Z(a)
in ?Z oP, i.e. a MP-clique in ?Z ;
8. if Y =X (Z , we can apply a Modus Ponens between a and b, so as to get a clique
in Z oPoP, to which we can apply a contraction; the result is noted b(a) and it
is a P-clique in Z ;
9. if Y =X?, we can see Y as X (K, and get a P-clique ha; bi= b(a) in K (we can
also see X as Y (K and introduce hb; ai= a(b), but observe that ha; bi= hb; ai, as
a consequence of the commutativity of c.
Let  be a functor from coherent spaces to themselves preserving directed colimits
and pull-backs; 8 then
1. if (f(Z)@P(Z)) is a stable family of P-cliques, then applying a 8-rule yields a
clique 8f in 8oP, i.e. a P-clique in 8;
2. if a is a P-clique in some (Z) (where Z is a coherent space), we can apply a
9-rule to a, so as to get a clique 9a in 9oP, i.e. a P-clique in 9.
7 To be precise, we use the variant introduced in [2], which allows the context to be an arbitrary Par-
monoid: in this paper spaces ?Z are shown to be universal Par-monoids.
8 The interpretation of second-order quantiers in coherent spaces is treated in the appendix.
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2.5. The category COH(MP)
Let us specify both a M and a P; then we can speak of a MP-clique in X as
being a pair (m; a) of m2M and a@X oP. MP morphisms from X to Y must
map MP-cliques to MP-cliques, preserve coherent sums of non-empty families, scalar
multiplication and contraction. The phenomenons already observed occur, namely that
MP-linear maps from X to Y are in natural bijection with MP-cliques in X (Y . In
particular, the set of all MP-linear maps from X to K is isomorphic to the set of
all MP-cliques in X?. The MP-cliques of K are pairs (m; a) of a point of M and a
clique of P.
The operations dened on P-cliques extend to MP-cliques:
Denition 7. Assume that (m; a) and (n; b) are MP-cliques in X and Y ; then we dene
1. (m; a)⊗ (n; b)= (mn; a⊗ b);
2. if m= n, (m; a)o (m; b)= (m; ao b);
3. 1(m; a)= (m;1(a)); 2(m; a)= (m;2(a));
4. !(m; a)= (m; !a);
5. d?Z(m; a)= (m; d?Z(a));
6. w?Z(m; a)= (m;w?Z(a));
7. c?Z(m; a)= (m; c?Z(a));
8. (n; b)((m; a))= (m:n; b(a))
9. h(m; a); (n; b)i=(m:n; ha; bi);
10. 8(m;f)= (m;8f);
11. 9(m; a)= (m;9a).
We shall use the notation a@MP X to speak of a MP-clique a of X .
3. Soundness
In this section we x once for all a monoid M, a Par-monoid P and a set B of
MP-cliques in K, i.e. a set of pairs (m; a), with m2M and a@P.
3.1. Denotational facts
Denition 8. When a@MP X; b@MP X?, the orthogonality relation is dened by a ?
b, ha; bi 2B.
The commutativity of c implies a symmetry of orthogonality: it is not aected by
the exchange of X and X?, i.e. b? a , a? b: this is why we can use the double
orthogonality without thinking twice.
Denition 9. A denotational fact (X;F) consists of a coherent space X together with
a set F of MP-cliques of X such that F=F??. When the context is clear we may
say \let F be a denotational fact".
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3.2. Interpretation of formulas
We concentrate on the interpretation of second-order propositional linear logic. We
assign to any formula A a denotational fact (A; A), provided we are given basic
assignments (; ) to the free variables of A: if we want to stress the inuence of
the interpretation (X;F) of some variable , we may use the more precise notation
A[X=]; A[F=] (in fact A only depends on X , whereas A depends on both X
and F). The denition is by induction on A:
1.  and  are part of the data;
2. (?)=()?, (?)=()?;
3. ? =K, ? =B;
4. 1=K, 1=(f(1;w(K))g)?? (we use the notation K for the singleton clique of
the coherent space K);
5. >= 0 (the empty coherent space), >= 0, i.e. it consists in all MP-cliques in
0, i.e. all (m; ;);
6. 0= 0, 0= ;??;
7. (A⊗ B)=A ⊗ B, (A⊗ B)= fa⊗ b; a2A; b2Bg??;
8. (AoB)=AoB, (AoB)= fc;8a2 (A)? c(a)2Bg;
9. (A B)=A  B, (A B)=(f1(a); a2Ag [ f2(b); b2Bg)??;
10. (AoB)=AoB, (AoB)= f(m; a)o (m; b); (m; a)2A ^ (m; b)2Bg;
11. (!A)= !A, (!A)=(f!(m; a); m2I ^ (m; a)2A)??, where I is the set of
m2M such that m=m2 and (m;w(K))2 1;
12. (?A)=?A, (?A)=(f!(m; a); m2I ^ (m; a)2 (A)?)?;
13. (9A)=9, where  is the functor associating to X (taken as ) the coherent
space A[X=]; (9A)= f9(m; a);9(Z;F)) (m; a)2A[F=]g?? (observe the
quantication over all denotational facts (Z;F));
14. (8A)=8, where  is the functor associating to X (taken as ) the coher-
ent space A[X=]; (8A)= f(m; a);8(X;F)(m; afX g)2A[F=]g (the notation
afX g is explained in the appendix).
Proposition 4. The interpretation of formulas is compatible with negation; i.e. (A)?
=(A?); in particular A is a denotational fact.
Proof. The last statement is just the remark that, since A=(A?)?, A=A??. The
main statement is proved by induction on A; some cases (=?; !=?) are dened by
duality and are therefore trivial. Let us check the other ones:
1. B= f(1;w(K))g? (immediate).
2. 0= ;? (immediate).
3. (A&B)=((A?B?))?; the result follows from the remark that if (m; a& b)2
(A&B) and a02A?; b02B?, then h(m; a& b);1(a0)i= h(m; a); a0i and h(m;
a& b);2(b0)i= h(m; b); b0i.
4. (AoB)= fa⊗ b; a2A? ^ b2B?g?; the result follows from the remark that, if
c2 (AoB) and a2A?; b2B?, then hc(a); bi= hc; a⊗ bi.
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5. (8A)=(9A?); the result follows from the remark that, if (8f)2 (8A) and
a2 (A?[Z=]) then h8f;9ai= hf(Z); ai.
Remark. Let us come back to the case of the connective o . (AoB) can be seen
as the set of MP-linear functions c sending A? to B but also as the set of such
MP-linear maps c whose adjoint ~c sends B? to A. With the latter denition it
amounts to verifying a condition h ~c(b); ai 2 B, for all b2B and all a2F where F
is such that A=F? (such a set is called a preorthogonal of A). But the equation
h ~c(b); ai= hc; a⊗ bi= hc(a); bi shows indeed that it is enough to require that c sends a
preorthogonal F of A into B. This is indeed the most precious lemma for soundness:
typically the axiom ‘ >; B will be shown to be sound on the sole grounds that > has
an empty preorthogonal.
The interpretation of formulas is easily transformed into an interpretation of sequents,
i.e. (‘ A1; : : : ; An) is the same as (A1o : : : oAn) (if we take seriously our convention
saying that o is associative, there is no need to make any distinction). From the
previous remark, there is the possibility to focus our denition on a particular Ak : let
Fi be preorthogonals of the Ai and ai 2Fi (i 6= k), then the result of n−1 cuts, together
with n−1 contractions, yields a member of Ak . The possibility of focusing renders the
verication of soundness almost trivial, because it produces a kind of \annihilation of
contexts", which reduces each rule to its simplest expression, e.g. the ⊗-rule is reduced
to \from ‘ A and ‘ B conclude ‘ A⊗B".
3.3. The soundness theorem
Denition 10. If a@X , we dene theMP-clique (a)@MP X as (a)= (1; (X ow)(a)).
A MP-clique of X is said to be essential when it is of the form (a). Essential
cliques are therefore those which do not make use of MP, or if one prefers, which are
parametric in MP. We use the notation a@e X to say that a is an essential MP-clique
of X .
The familiar interpretation of the rules of linear logic (see the appendix for quanti-
ers) assigns a clique @A to a proof  of A.
Theorem 1. If  is a proof of a sequent ‘  ; then ()2 .
Proof. The proof oers no diculty. Let us treat some cases:
1. The identity axiom ‘ A?; A, is shown to be sound by focusing on A: if a2A, then
()(a)= a2A.
2. The exchange rule is shown to be sound essentially because of the commutativity
of c, which is already at work in our denitions.
3. The cut-rule is the rst example of focusing, i.e. annihilation of the context. The
rule leads from ‘  ; A and ‘ ; A? to  ; , and annihilation of contexts reduces it
to a rule leading from ‘ A and ‘ A? to ‘. Soundness of the rule is nothing but
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checking that, if a2A; b2A?, then ha; bi 2B. Of course what is implicitly used
is that \annihilation of contexts" commutes with the rule.
4. The case of a o -rule: by annihilation of contexts, it is reduced to \from ‘ A; B,
deduce ‘ AoB"; now, the soundness is almost tautological.
5. Most other cases are as tautological, using the denition of A. Only three rules
deserve a closer look, namely the rules for ?: this is because this connective is
dened by duality.
6. The case of a dereliction rule reduces to \from ‘ A deduce ‘?A"; soundness of the
rule is consequence of the equation hd?Z(m; a); (n; !b)i=(m:n; ha; bi);
7. The case of a weakening rule reduces to \from ‘ deduce ‘?A"; soundness of the
rule is consequence of the equation hw?Z(m; a); (n; !b)i=(m:n; a), and that, if n2I,
and (m; a)2B, then (m:n; a)2B;
8. The case of a contraction rule reduces to \from ‘?A; ?A deduce ‘?A"; soundness of
the rule is consequence of the equation hc?Z(m; a); (n; !b)i=(m:n; ha(!b); !bi), and
that, if n2I, then n2 = n.
4. Completeness
We now restrict our attention to 1-formulas, i.e. formulas without second-order
existential quantiers. Let A be a closed 1-formula, and let a be a clique in A such
that (a)2A for all possible M;P and B; then we shall establish that a=  for some
proof  of A. For this it will be enough to produce specic M;P and B, such that,
if (a)2A for these particular M;P and B, then a is a . The delicate question
is indeed the commutativity of Par-monoid, and this problem will force us to replace
formulas with occurrences.
4.1. The monoid
Denition 11. Let us x once for all a denumerable set L of labels. An occurrence
is a pair (A; l) of a 1 formula A, and a label l2A.
The monoid M is made of contexts, i.e. nite multisets of formulas, but the multi-
plicity of formulas ?A is not taken into account. Multiplication is the sum of multisets
and the unit is the empty multiset. An element of M is pure when it is a set, i.e. all
multiplicities are 1.
Remark. The use of occurrences is an easy way to distinguish denumerably many vari-
ants of the same formula. We shall therefore keep on speaking of formulas, but we have
to remember in some cases to be precise about the labels. Typically ?A:?A=?A, but
this idempotency only holds between the same occurrences, i.e. (?A; l):(?A; l)= (?A; l).
No cancellation occurs between dierent occurrences.
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4.2. The Par-monoid
Denition 12. The Rado graph is a denumerable coherent space R with the following
property: given any nite coherent spaces X and Y and embeddings 9 f of X into
Y; g of X into R, there is an embedding h of Y into R such that g= hf:
Remark. The Rado graph is therefore solution of a weak universal problem; in partic-
ular it is easily shown to be unique up to isomorphism, isomorphic to its negation, etc.,
but the isomorphisms are never unique. The Rado graph is used to interpret variables,
i.e. =R: in what follows, when we refer to A, we shall always assume that the
free variables of A have been interpreted by R.
Denition 13. The Par-monoid P is dened as follows:
 jPj consists of all nite multisets 10 Q(Ai; xi), with xi 2 jAi j; such a multiset is pure
when all the Ai are distinct; we dene k
Q
(Ai; xi)k=
Q
Ai.
 Let Q(Ai; xi);
Q
(Bj; yj) be distinct elements of jPj; then
Q
(Ai; xi) _
Q
(Bj; yj) i
{ both are pure
{ kQ(Ai; xi)k= k
Q
(Bj; yj)k, hence by purity
Q
(Bj; yj)=
Q
(Ai; x0i), for a unique
family x0i
{ xi _ x0i for some index i.
 w (seen as a clique) is the singleton f1g, where 1 is the empty product;
 c is given by its trace, which consists of 3-tuples of elements of jPj:
{ all (a; 1; a);
{ all (1; a; a);
{ all (a; b; c) where a; b; c are pure, with kak= kbk= kck=?  for some  , i.e.
a=
Q
(?Ai; xi); b=
Q
(?Ai; yi); c=
Q
(?Ai; zi) and (xi; yi; zi)2 c?A
i ; here we use
the structure of Par-monoid of ?Ai .
{ more generally, all (a:a0; b:b0; c:a0:b0), with a:a0; b:b0 pure, ka0k\ kb0k= ;, and
(a; b; c) is like in the previous case.
Proposition 5. P is a Par-monoid.
9 See Denition 16.
10 We use a multiplicative notation for multisets; hence the empty multiset is noted 1 and the usual sum
of multisets is a product.
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Proof. The proof basically uses the fact that ?Ai is a Par-monoid. Observe that c never
contains (a; b; c) when kak= kbk is a formula (A; l) not beginning with an interrogation
mark: it would be impossible to ensure commutativity. In compensation we have 3-
tuples (a; b; c) when kak=(A; l); kbk=(A; l0) and l 6= l0.
4.3. The denotational fact B
Let us slightly modify the rules of linear logic, in order to cope with occurrences:
sequents must now be pure, i.e. without repetitions: if we want to use A twice in  , we
must use two dierent occurrences (A; l) and (A; l0). This induces another modication
of the rules, i.e. we can no longer write an explicit contraction rule, since we would
be forced to have twice the same occurrence in premise. So we drop contraction, but
we allow in the two multiplicative binary rules
(⊗ and CUT) some formulas (?C; l) to be present in both premises, although the
conclusion retains only one copy of any such formula.
Denition 14. B consists of all  := :fQ(Ai; xi);
Q
Ai= ; (xi)2 g, such that 
is a proof of   (so that   is pure) and of all  :a such that   is impure.
B has some immediate properties which are easily transferred to any denotational
fact:
Proposition 6. Let F be a denotational fact; then
1. All   : a with   impure belong to F. In the next cases; we assume that labels
have been chosen so as to ensure that all sequents involved are pure.
2. If (( ; A; B) : a)2F and a0 is obtained from a by applying a o -rule between A
and B; then (( ; AoB) : a0)2F.
3. Denotational facts are closed under dereliction: if (( ; A) : a)2F and a0 is ob-
tained by a dereliction on A; then (( ; ?A) : a0)2F.
4. Denotational facts are closed under weakening: if   : a2F and a0 is obtained by
a weakening on ?A; then (( ; ?A) : a0)2F.
Proof. More or less immediate: each property is shown to hold for B, then it is
transferred to any denotational fact by orthogonality.
Proposition 7. The set I consists of all contexts ? .
Proof. The only idempotents are the ? ; moreover the closure of denotational facts
under weakening forces ? :w(K))2 1.
4.4. The completeness theorem
Let us add a new label l0 to L, so as to ensure that, when we speak of ‘ A;  ,
we can give this extra label to A. A proof of ‘ A;   induces a clique in Ao , and
therefore as a clique in AoP, i.e. a P-clique in A.
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Denition 15. Given any 1 formula A, we introduce
A= f  : a;  impure _ 9( proof of ‘ A;  g ^ a= )
(the denition uses the new label facility). From this we can dene a model by means
of = .
Proposition 8. If A is 1; then AA.
Proof. Observe that A is a denotational fact: if   is pure, then   : a2A i a= 
where  is a proof of ‘  ; (A; l0). Using the P-clique idAl of A? which interprets
the identity axiom ‘ (A?; l0); (A; l), we can observe that ha; idAl i is nothing but the
interpretation of , when l0 has been replaced with l; moreover, l can be chosen so
as to make  ; (A; l) pure. We easily conclude that  :a2A i it is orthogonal to all
cliques idl, i.e. A is the orthogonal of something. This observation is crucial, since we
no longer need to check the inclusion AA: we can content ourselves with FA,
where A=F??.
The proof is rather trivial, and is by induction on A;
1.   by denition.
2. ? ?; assume that   : a?  and that   is pure. But id?l 2 , and since
?= fid?l ; l2Lg?g, we easily conclude that  :a2 ?.
3. 1  = f1:w(K))g??, but K is the interpretation of the axiom for 1, hence 1
1??=1.
4. ? =B= ?.
5. Since 0= ;??; 0 0=0??.
6. > consists of all   : a such that, if   is pure, then ‘ >;   is provable and a is
the interpretation of such a proof, which must be an empty clique, i.e. >=>.
7. Assume that AA, BB; (A⊗B)=F??, with F= fa⊗ b; a2A; b2Bg
(indeed we can even restrict to G= f  : c2F;  pureg). If a2A; b2B, both
come from proofs, and by a ⊗-rule a⊗ b2 (A⊗B), at least when the restrictions
on purity apply, which shows that GA⊗B, and so (A⊗B) (A⊗B)??=
(A⊗B).
8. Assume that AA; BB; this implies that (A; l):idAl 2A?, (B; l0):idBl0 2B?,
so (((A; l); (B; l0)):idAl ⊗ idBl0)2A?⊗B? (AoB)?. Now we observed that de-
notational facts are closed under the o -rule, and applying this to idAl ⊗ idBl0 , we
get (AoB; l00):idAo Bl00 2 (AoB)?, hence (AoB) (AoB).
9. Assume that AA; BB; (AB)=F??, with F= f1(a); a2Ag[
f2(b); b2Bg. If   : a2A, and   is pure, then a comes from a proof of
 ; A, and 1(a) comes from a proof of  ; AB; similarly if  :b2B, then
2(b) comes from a proof of  ; AB. From this we get F(AB), hence
(AB)(aB)??=
(AB).
10. Assume that AA; BB; if  :(a&b)2 (A&B), and   is pure, then  :a2A,
hence it comes from a proof of ‘  ; A; for similar reasons b comes from a proof of
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‘  ; B, and applying a &-rule, we see that a& b comes from a proof of ‘  ; A&B;
this proves that (A&B) (A&B).
11. Assume that AA; then !A=F??, with F= f :!a; 2I^ a2Ag. Now,
I consists exactly of all contexts ? . If a2F, then a comes from a proof of
? ; a, and !a corresponds to the application of a !-rule to this proof, i.e. !a comes
from a proof of ? ; !A. From this we get F !A, hence !A !A??= !A.
12. Assume that AA; then (A; l):idAl 2A?, and by closure of denotational facts
under dereliction, we get another clique a such that (?A; l0):a2A?. From this
(?A; l0):!a2 !A?, i.e. (?A; l0):id?Al 2 !A?, from which we get ?A ?A.
13. Assume that AA; then, if  :a2 (8A), we get in particular that  :afRg2
A@A. This forces afRg to be the interpretation of a proof of ‘  ; A. Since R is
big enough, afRg denes a uniquely, hence, if we apply a 8-rule to the function
afX g, we get the interpretation of a proof of ‘  ; 8A. So (8A) (8A).
Theorem 2. If A is a closed 1 formula and (a) is an essential clique in A; then
a= ; for some proof  of A.
Proof. We apply the proposition and conclude that (a)2A, and since the empty
context is pure, we conclude that (a) is the interpretation of a proof of A in the
empty context, i.e. that a is the interpretation of a proof of A.
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Appendix A. The semantics of second-order quantiers
We sketch the interpretation of second-order quantiers. The original interpretation
is to be found in [1], for the intuitionistic case, i.e. system F. We stick to the notations
introduced in [3].
A.1. Stable functors
Denition A.1. If X and Y are coherent spaces, an embedding from X to Y is an injec-
tive map f from the web jX j of X to the web jY j of Y such that 8x; y2 jX j (x _y ,
f(x)_f(y)). An embedding induces a linear map (still denoted f) from X to Y :
f(a)= ff(x); x2 jX jg and a linear map f−1 from Y to X : f−1(b)= fx2 jX j;
f(x)2 bg. Obviously f−1f= idX , whereas ff−1 is idempotent, i.e. is a projection
of Y . The category COHe is dened as the category of coherent spaces equipped with
embeddings (instead of linear maps). We denote by =(X; Y ) the set of all embeddings
from X into Y .
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Proposition A.1. In COHe any coherent space is the directed colimit of nite coher-
ent spaces.
Proof. Let X be a coherent space, and let I consist of all nite subsets of jX j. If i2 I ,
then jX j \ i is naturally equipped with a structure of coherent space Xi, and X is the
union of the Xi, indeed a directed union. Inclusion maps are the simplest embeddings,
and directed colimits of inclusions are exactly directed unions.
All connectives of linear logic are easily transformed into (covariant) functors. As-
sume that f2=(X; X 0) and g2=(Y; Y 0); then
1. one denes f ⊗ g2=(X ⊗ Y; X 0 ⊗ Y 0) by (f ⊗ g)(x; y)= (f(x); g(y));
2. one denes fo g2=(X o Y; X 0o Y 0) by (fo g)(x; y)= (f(x); g(y));
3. one denes f&g2=(X&Y; X 0&Y 0) by (f&g)(x; 0)= (f(x); 0),
(f&g)(y; 1)= (g(y); 1);
4. one denes f  g2=(X  Y; X 0  Y 0) by (f  g)(x; 0)= (f(x); 0),
(f  g)(y; 1)= (g(y); 1);
5. one denes !f2=(!X; !X 0) by !f([x1; : : : ; xn])= [f(x1); : : : ; f(xn)];
6. one denes ?f2=(?X; ?X 0) by ?f([x1; : : : ; xn])= [f(x1); : : : ; f(xn)].
Remark. In fact, these functors are nothing but existing constructions: for instance f⊗g
is just the interpretation of the derived rule \From X (Y and X 0(Y 0 conclude X ⊗
X 0 ( Y ⊗Y 0", restricted to the case where the premises are interpreted by embeddings.
But this does not apply to negation (which is not an ocial connective in our setting),
since the rule \From X (Y deduce X?(Y?" is wrong. But the crucial point of
the restriction to embeddings is that negation becomes a covariant functor: just dene
f?=f. Moreover, it is obvious from the denitions that our functors are compatible
with negation, e.g. (f ⊗ g)?=f?o g?.
Proposition A.2. The functors corresponding to the connectives of linear logic pre-
serve directed colimits and pull-backs.
Proof. An embedding is the composition of an inclusion map with an isomorphism.
All our functors preserve inclusions. Preservation of direct limits is basically nothing
but the fact that all our functors preserve directed unions, which is immediate from the
nitary character of our constructions (directedness is only needed for exponentials).
The pull-back between two inclusions X Z and Y Z is noting but the inclusion
X \ Y Z ; preservation of pull-backs is therefore nothing more than preservation of
intersections.
Remark. Any rst-order formula A can be seen as a functor of its variables. More
precisely to any formula A we can associate a functor from COHe
n to COHe, where
the integer n is used to index the free variables of A. Basically, A(X1; : : : ; Xn) is
the interpretation of A when 1; : : : ; n are, respectively, interpreted by X1; : : : ; Xn, and
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A(f1; : : : ; fn)2=(A(X1; : : : ; Xn); A(Y1; : : : ; Yn)) when the fi 2=(Xi; Yi). These func-
tors preserve directed colimits and pull-backs; indeed, the interpretation (to be dened)
of second-order quantiers will still produce functors preserving directed colimits and
pull-backs, i.e. the general paradigm of dependency of a formula over a second-order
variable is that of a functor from COHe to COHe preserving directed colimits and
pull-backs.
Denition A.2. A stable functor is a functor from COHe to itself preserving direct
limits and pull-backs.
Proposition A.3. Let  be a stable functor from COHe to itself. Let X be a coherent
space; and let z 2 j(X )j; then
1: There exits a nite coherent space X0 together with an embedding f2=(X0; X )
and z0 2 j(X0)j such that z=(f)(z0); in the sequel; X0 is chosen with the small-
est possible cardinality.
2: Assume that X1; g; z1 are such that z1 2 j(X1)j and z=(g)(z1); then there ex-
ists an embedding h2=(X0; X1) such that f= gh and z1 =(h)(z0); moreover; if
h0 2=(X0; X1) is such that f= gh0 and z1 =(h0)(z0); then h and h0 have the same
range.
Proof. Nothing essential is lost if we assume that  actually preserves inclusions. Then
j(X )j= S(Xi) for a directed family (Xi) of nite coherent spaces, and we can nd
some index (let us say 0) such that z 2(X0). We are done with the rst part of the
proposition. Let us therefore choose X0 minimal among those coherent spaces which
are included in X such that z 2(X0) (and for f the inclusion map). We claim that X0
is uniquely determined by this requirement, for if X1 is any sub-coherent space of X
such that z 2(X1), then by preservation of intersections, z 2(X0\X1), which forces
X0X1. This almost proves the second statement, taking for h the inclusion between
X0 and X1. Now observe that the range of h is exactly X0, and if we were taking
another solution h0 (maybe no longer an inclusion) this would still be true.
Remark. In the second statement, h is not unique, which would be the case if 
were preserving kernels (i.e. equalizers). What may happen is that X0 has a non-trivial
automorphism  such that ()(z)= z. The simplest case is with (X )= !X and X0
has two coherent atoms a and b: if  ips a and b, then !([a; b])= [a; b].
Let us now select, once for all a denumerable family Fi of nite coherent spaces
such that:
1. Any nite coherent space is isomorphic to some Fi.
2. Any two Fi with distinct indices are non-isomorphic.
Such a family (Fi) is called a basis; since we selected one basis, we shall refer to it
as \the" basis.
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Denition A.3. If  is a stable functor, then we dene Tr() to consist of all pairs
(F; z) such that F belongs to the basis, z 2 j(F)j and for any embedding h from
some element of the basis G into F , z is not in the range of f, unless F =G. On the
trace we dene an equivalence: (F; z) ’ (F 0; z0) i F =F 0 and z=()(z0) for some
automorphism  of F . In practice, we work on the quotient Tr()= ’, but we shall
work as if we had chosen one (F; z) in any equivalence class.
Our proposition can now be restated as: z 2 j(X )j can be written z=(f)(z0) for
some (F; z0)2Tr() and f2=(F; X ). (F; z0) is unique up to ’ and the range of f is
uniquely determined.
A.2. Stable families
Denition A.4. Let  be a stable functor; then we dene the coherent space 8 as
follows:
 j8j consists of all (equivalence classes) of pairs (F; z)2Tr() such that: for all G
in the basis, for all embeddings f;f0 2=(F;G), then (f)(z)^_(f0)(z).
 (F; z)^_ (F 0; z0) i for all G in the basis, for all embeddings f2=(F;G) and f0 2
=(F 0; G), then (f)(z)^_(f0)(z0).
We dene the coherent space 9 by duality: 9=(8?)?.
Remark. In the previous denition we can replace the quantication on G by a quan-
tication over all coherent spaces, which is not extremely elegant. We can also take
an opposite bias, namely replace the quantication on all G in the basis by a quan-
tication over all G in the basis and all f;f0 such that the union of the ranges of f
and f0 covers G. Such a quantication is indeed a nite one, which shows the nitary
character of our denition.
Denition A.5. Let  be a stable functor; a stable family (of cliques) in  is a family
(aX ) indexed by all coherent spaces, such that:
 aX @(X )
 if f2=(X; Y ), then aX =(f)−1(aY ).
Remark. A stable family is nothing more than a cartesian natural transformation from
the constant functor K to . Cartesianity, which is a pull-back diagram, is expressed
by aX =(f)−1(aY ), which is stronger than (f)(aX ) aY .
Proposition A.4. Stable families in  are in 1{1 correspondence with cliques in 8.
More precisely:
1: To any coherent clique a=(aX ); we associate its trace Tr(a)= f(F; z)2 j8j;
z 2 aFg.
2: To any clique A@8 we associate a coherent clique (AfX g); dened by AfX g=
f(f)(z); (F; z)2A; f2=(F; X ).
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Proof. It is not dicult to check that Tr(a) is a clique and that (afX g) is a stable
family. It remains to show that the two operations are reciprocal.
Let us check the most delicate point, namely that, if a=(aX ), then Tr(a)fX g= aX ,
whose non-trivial part is the inclusion aX Tr(a)fX g. Now, if zX @(X ), then one
can nd (F; z0)2Tr() (indeed in j8j) and f2=(F; X ) with z=(f)(z0); the
property will be immediate if we can show that (F; z0)2Tr(a). Now observe that
aF =(f)−1(aX ), from this we get z=(f)(z00) for some z
0
0’ z0, i.e. z00 =()(z0)
for some automorphism  of F , and so z 2()−1(F)=(F), i.e. (F; z)2Tr(a).
Remark. The interpretation of quantiers will therefore work in strict analogy to the
case of implication: the trace replaces a function (stable family) with a clique, and the
operation AfX g denes a function from a clique. These two operations can therefore
be taken as the interpretations of 8-introduction and 8-elimination, if we were dealing
with natural deduction; with our syntactical choice, AfX g will be used for the 9-rule.
Should we work in system F, we would interpret the reduction rule (t)  t[=],
by the denotational equality Tr(t)fg= t : in linear logic this denotational equality
is behind the denotational invariance under cut-elimination.
A.3. Interpretation of quantiers
If A induces a stable functor  (corresponding to the variable ), then we can set
(8A)=8 and (9A)=9. Moreover, if  is indeed a stable functor of several
variables, then 8A and 9A are stable functors of the remaining variables, so that we
can go on and interpret any quantied formula.
It remains to interpret the logical rules for second-order quantiers. But remember
that we need to assign some arbitrary coherent space X to any free variable  of A,
with the consequence that the interpretation  of a proof  of a formula A (in which
 occurs) is a family indexed by X , indeed a stable one; the same is true for the proof
of a sequent.
Denition A.6. (1) Let  be a proof of ‘  ; A, and assume that = X is the co-
herent family interpreting  (with =X ), and let 0 be obtained from  by a 8-
rule, with conclusion ‘  ;8A (so  is not free in  ). We dene (0)= fx(F; z);
xz 2 Fg.
(2) Let  be a proof of ‘  ; A[B=], and let 0 be obtained from  by means of an
9-rule, with conclusion ‘  ;9A. We dene 0= fx(F; z); (F; z)2 j9Aj ^ 9f2
=(F; B)(x(f)(z)2 g.
The denotational invariance under cut-elimination is essentially a consequence of
Proposition A.4; denotational invariance was used in Proposition 4 under the form
h8f;9ai= hf(Z); ai. It would also be necessary to check that all families con-
structed (including those coming from the last denition) are stable ones, but this is
straightforward.
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Appendix B. Open questions
B.1. First-order quantiers
Our result deals with second-order propositional calculus, whereas the standard com-
pleteness result for classical logic involves rst-order predicate calculus (and can be
extended to 1 formulas without any problem). So the question is to which extent
one can get a denotational completeness for closed 1-formulas of second-order linear
predicate calculus. This seems to oer no conceptual diculty, but it may stumble on
some technicalities.
 The denotational interpretation of rst-order quantication is not something very
natural. Should a rst-order 8 be seen as an innite &, and in this case what is the
index set? Or should it be treated in a more uniform spirit?
 When we speak of a closed formula, it means \no parameters", in particular, predi-
cate constants and function symbols must be universally quantied; the question of
second-order function quantiers may be technically delicate.
B.2. Non-commutative logic
Obviously, the use of non-commutative M and P would model non-commutative
variants of linear logic. The question is not that much the question of extending com-
pleteness, but the question of using the new idea to choose between the several known
variants of non-commutative linear logic.
B.3. Why a bimodule?
The monoid plays a modest role, and it is likely that the present structure of \bi-
module" can be collapsed to something simpler. We say \simpler", and we mean it,
i.e. one should exclude solutions which consist in encoding M into P but which blur
the global structure.
B.4. Plain completeness
Classical completeness is \a rst-order formula A true in any model is provable";
now if we quantify A over all its parameters (domain of the model, predicate con-
stants, function symbols) we get a 1-formula B, and the truth of A in any model is
the same as the truth11 of B. Hence classical completeness is exactly \A true closed
1-formula is provable". There is something slightly unsatisfactory in our extension,
since the classical case refers to plain truth, whereas, we have to parametrize our mod-
els by M, P and B. Is this in the nature of things, or is there a natural choice of M,
P and B (we exclude as a natural choice the 3-tuple constructed for the sake of the
proof).
11Please do not \correct" this into \truth in the standard model": : : what do you think that standard
means?
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B.5. Other linear semantics
Let us end with a technical question: the use of the monoid and the Par-monoid is
enough to get completeness w.r.t. coherent semantics, which was already a reasonable
semantics in terms of completeness (e.g. not identifying ⊗ and o , etc.). Would it be
the same with semantics coming from standard algebra and which are known to make
\mistakes"? In other terms, can we perform the same kind of modication on any
decent semantics and get completeness? A positive answer would be very interesting.
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